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THE LAW OF THE DOMICIL AS AFFECTING
THE VALIDITY OF MARRIAGES IN A
FOREIGN JURISDICTION
A perplexing problem of conflict of laws confronts a court
which must decide to what extent the law of the domicil affects the
validity of marriages celebrated in other states. The decisions in
this jurisdiction concerning the validity of such marriages are not
clear.1 M'[uch of the confusion is to be attributed to ambiguities in
the statute law.2 And because the marriage law has been altered
in the few years since the Revised Code, it is evident that the legis-
lature is still seeking a more workable marriage law. However,
these changes are expressive of the desire to alter our social policy,
rather than an attempt to clarify the law. Therefore, in discussing
this problem of the validity of foreign marriages, a brief discussion
of the law of West Virginia is deemed necessary.
By legislative action, the great majority of invalid marriages
celebrated within this jurisdiction are rendered voidable.4 By con-
struction of another statute' the majority of the court has held
that a second marriage celebration here in violation of a divorce
decree is absolutely void.( It will be noted that these are the only
1 McManus v. Commissioner, 113 W. Va. 566, 169 S. E. 172 (1933); John-
son v. Commissioner, 116 W. Va. 232, 179 S. E. 814 (1935).
2 W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 1, "All marriages between a white
person and a negro; all marriages which are prohibited by law on account of
either of the parties having a former wife or husband then living; all mar-
riages which are prohibited by law on account of consanguinity or affinity be-
tween the parties; . . . [enumerating other instances of marriages] . . . shall
be void from the time they are so declared by a decree of nullity." This sec-
tion is hereafter referred to as the voidable marriage statute. W. VA. REV. CODE
(1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 22, "When a divorce from the bond of matrimony is
decreed, neither party to the marriage so dissolved shall in any case again
marry within six months from the date of the decree. . . . and any marriage
contracted by any divorced party, except a remarriage to the person from whom
divorced, within the prohibited period, shall be void, and the party shall be
criminally liable the same as if no divorce had been granted. . . .1' This sec-
tion is hereafter referred to as the prohibitory statute. The inconsistency was
found to exist when the court was called upon to determine whether the word
"void" (as used in the second quoted section) was to be construed in the light
of the preceding section, and thus mean voidable only. Italics ours.
The sections have now been amended by Acts 1935, c. 35, but not in any
material way, so as to effect the quoted sections as commented upon in this
note.
3 W. Va. Acts (1935) c. 35. § 1 is amended, but the amendment is immate-
rial to this article. § 22: "'When a divorce is decreed neither party to the mar-
riage so dissolved shall in any case again marry within sixty days from the
date of the decree, or pending an appeal of the case in the supreme court. .
(Italics ours, to indicate change in 1931 section).
4 W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) a. 48, art. 2, § 1, supra n. 2.
5 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 22, supra n. 2.
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void marriages in West Virginia, as marriages usually held void
as against public policy, are grouped under the voidable marriage
statute.7
It is generally accepted that the validity of a marriage is
determined by the laws of the state of celebration. Although a
common-law marriage is not recognized here, such a marriage if
valid where consummated is valid here also.' But the law of the
domicil may determine the validity of a foreign marriage, where
public policy of the state of domicil is against such a marriage.9
An express statutory provision has been made for domiciliaries
who go outside of this jurisdiction to be married in order that they
may evade our statutory requirements." And as the voidable mar-
riage statute expressly says all marriages, it may be argued that
it will apply with equal force to marriages in a foreign juris-
diction, where the parties to the marriage are domiciliaries of this
state.
The law is not so clear where the foreign marriage is a second
marriage within the prohibition period of a divorce decree. If the
prohibition is applicable to the guilty party only, courts have re-
garded it as merely a penalty, and therefore without extra-terri-
torial effect, and the subsequent marriage in another jurisdiction
valid."' But where the prohibition exists as to both parties, as
under our prohibitory statute, 2 it is no longer a penalty, but
rather a method of discouraging collusive divorces obtained with
a view to a quick marriage with another. In this case, the foreign
marriage cannot be so easily disposed of.
0 Majority opinion. Hall v. Baylous, 109 W. Va. 1, 153 S. E. 293 (1930).
A got a divorce a vinculo from her husband B in West Virginia. The decree
forbade her marrying again for six months. Four months later, and in West
Virginia, she married 0, who died. A claimed certain property of G's as her
dower.
7 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 1, supra n. 2.
8 Jackson v. Commissioner, 106 W. Va. 374, 145 S. E. 753 (1928).
9 Kinney v. Commonwealth, 30 Gratt. 858 (Va. 1878) ; Heflinger v. Heflinger,
136 Va. 289, 118 S. E. 316 (1923) ; Note (1927) 33 W. VA. L. Q 207, 208.
10 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 1, § 17. Under this section "such
marriages shall be governed by the same law, in all respects, as if it had been
solemnized in this State." Therefore, these marriages will be voidable be-
cause they, if solemnized in this jurisdiction, would come under the voidable
marriage statute.
1 2 BaiE, CONFLICT OF LAws (1935) § 130.1 at p. 685. RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAws (1926) § 130.
22 Sgupra n. 2.
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STUDENT NOTES
It has been held in the case of McManus v. Commissioner"'
that a marriage within the prohibited period, though it be cele-
brated in another state and by that law valid, is void ab initio.
This decision blindly follows the rule of the Baylous case without
regard to the separate and distinct situations of the two cases.14
The most practical solution of this problem is set forth in the Re-
statement of Conflict of Laws." Under this rule, if the marriage
during the period of prohibition is valid under the law of the state
of celebration, it is valid everywhtere, unless (1) the time named
is the time within which an appeal may be taken, or (2) the statute
is inteipreted as being applicable to the marriage of domiciliaries
in another state, or (3) the marriage be incestuous, bigamous, or
inter-racial and therefore void.
It appears that our prohibitory statute may have extra-
territorial effect under the exceptions to the Restatement rule. Un-
der the amendment to this statute, 6 the clause "or pending an ap-
peal in the supreme court" has been added. And further, in the
McManus case,1 7 while the court did not expressly state that our
statute applied to the marriage of our domiciliaries in other
states, yet in effect, they interpreted the statute as having that
purpose.
Another interesting situation is presented by the case of John-
son v. Commissioner.' Here the plaintiff's husband, J, domiciled
in Virginia, received his divorce decree there, under the Virginia
statute which provided that:
".... such bond of matrimony shall not be deemed to be
dissolved as to any marriage subsequent to such decree, or in
any prosecution on account thereof, until the expiration of
such six months."
Within three months, J, having come to West Virginia and found
a job here, married the plaintiff. The court held this subsequent
marriage void. It will be noted that the court, purporting to apply
13 ,Supra n. 1. Here A was divorced in West Virginia, the decree prohibiting
marriage for six months. Within such period, A married in Ohio, this mar-
riage being in regular form and valid under Ohio law.
'4 In the Baylous case the prohibited marriage was celebrated in West Vir-
ginia, and governed directly by our statute. In effect, what the court is say-
ing in the McManus case is that because A was domiciled in West Virginia, our
prohibitory statute applies to her subsequent marriage wherever celebrated.
15 §§ 131, 132.
26 W. Va. Acts 1935) c. 35, § 22, supra n. 3.
17 Supra n. 13.
s 116 W. Va. 232, 179 S. B. 814 (1935).
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Virginia law, cited as authority the Baylous case.'19 If the Virginia
law is to be applied to this marriage the decision of the Johnson
ease cannot be attacked. However, the facts of the case suggest the
question of whether J had become domiciled in West Virginia. As-
suming the domicil as changed to West Virginia, what law should
the court apply?
Upon conflicts principles, the law of Virginia should be ap-
plied to determine J's status when he came to West Virginia. Un-
der the Virginia statute a divorce decree was provisional only until
the expiration of the six-month period. Therefore J was, in effect,
a validly married man. Whether from this point the law of West
Virginia or of Virginia should be applied depends on the domicil
of J at the time of his second marriage. If J were here domiciled,
West Virginia law would apply, and J would be the party to a
bigamous marriage, which by statute is voidable only. If, however,
J retained his Virginia domicil, it is the duty of the court to apply
Virginia law to reach its decision. Therefore, it appears that the
extra-territorial effect of any prohibitory statute must depend on
whether the party is still a domiciliary of the state rendering the
divorce decree when he enters into his subsequent marriage.
20
G. G. B.
10 See Judge Maxwell's dissent that the Baylous case cannot properly apply
to this situation. This seems to be the correct view.
20 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT o LAws §§ 131, 132.
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